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Validity and Time of Presentment
Through the Clearing House
Fletcher Reed Andrews
THE PURPOSE of this article is to examine and discuss the deci-
sions relating to the validity of presenting checks for payment
through the clearing house and the decisions relating to the time
of presentment of checks where presentment is made through the
clearing house.
An extended description of the operation of the city clearing
house is not necessary to an understanding of the legal problems
presented.' It is sufficient to recall that in a city which has a clear-
ing house, each bank
takes its checks to the
DEAN ANDREWS (A.B., 1916, Dartmouth clearing house, where all
College; LL.B., 1925, Western Reserve checks drawn on a given
University; J.S.D., 1941, Yale University)
has been on the faculty of Western Reserve bank are delivered to its
University School of Law since 1927. His clerk or messenger, who
contributions to legal periodicals have in- takes them to the drawee
cluded articles on Bills and Notes and Ohio
annotations to the RESTATEMENT OF CON- bank, where they are
FLICT OF LAws-for which he is the Ohio examined and debited
annotator. He was editor of BALDwIn's Omo against the drawer's ac-
LAw RE iEw (Supp. 1931), and associate
editor of THRocMORTON'S Omo GENERAL count, or returned if
CODE (1929). not good. Temporary
credits and debits are
entered at the clearing
house, but may be revoked under certain conditions with which
we are not here concerned.2 If not so revoked, they become final.
Validity of Presentment at or through the Clearing House
The Negotiable Instruments Law requires that the instrument
be presented for payment in order to charge the drawer and in-
dorsers, and that the presentment be made at a proper place as
therein defined.' By Section 73 (2), presentment for payment is
made at a proper place:
1 For such a description, see Andrews, The Operation of the City Clearing House,
51 YALE L.J. 582 (1942).
2 See Andrews, supra note 1, at 590.
3 NEGOTIAMLE INSTRIMENTS LAW §§70, 72 (3). Section 185 makes these and
the other sections cited infra applicable to checks.
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Where no place of payment is specified, but the address
of the person to make payment is given in the instrument
and it is there presented.4
Interpreted literally, this authorizes presentment at the office
of the bank if the address appears upon the check, but does not
tell the holder what to do with a check which omits the address.
Happily, the void is filled by the next subsection, providing that
presentment for payment is made at the proper place:
(3) Where no place of payment is specified and no ad-
dress is given and the instrument is presented at the usual
place of business ... of the person to make payment. 5
Nothing in the quoted sections designates the clearing house
as a proper place for presentment. However, as explained above,
the drawee bank's delivery clerk brings the packages of checks
from the clearing house to his bank, where the checks are exam-
ined and either honored or returned dishonored. Thus, under the
ordinary procedure, the check actually reaches the office of the
drawee bank, and if the delivery of the checks by the delivery
clerk to the proper employee at the bank constitutes a presentment
for payment, the Negotiable Instruments Law is satisfied. From
a common sense viewpoint the routine referred to should be re-
garded as a presentment for payment. The purpose of requiring
such presentment is to find out whether or not the drawee is
willing to pay the check. This is accomplished as well through
the medium of the clearing house as by direct presentment at the
drawee's counter.
The situation is analogous to that involved in an early New
York case, decided before the establishment of the clearing house.
Pursuant to the custom then existing in New York, the drawee
bank's porter called upon the plaintiff bank and received from it
the checks held against the drawee. The porter took the checks
to the drawee bank's office, where the check in litigation was dis-
honored and sent back to the plaintiff bank. In a suit by the lat-
ter against an indorser, the court decided that there had been a
valid presentment. Considering the drawee bank's porter as
plaintiff's agent for the purpose of presenting the check, the court
held that the procedure was as effectual as a direct presentment
by one of the plaintiff's officials.6
4 Section 191 defines "person" as including a body of persons, whether in-
corporated or not.
5 It should be noted in passing that by the first subsection of § 73 presentment
is made at the proper place, "Where a place of payment is specified in the
instrument and it is there presented."
6 Merchants' Bank v. Spicer, 6 Wend. 443 (N.Y. 1831).
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No less effectual is a presentment through the clearing house,
and the courts have upheld such a method.' As remarked in the
Columbia-Knickerbocker Trust Company case,' the clearing house
routine obviates the necessity of having someone stand at the
counter of the drawee bank to receive payment, and answers the
same purpose. Since the check actually reaches the drawee bank's
office and is handed to the employee whose duty it is to honor
or dishonor it, Section 73 of the Negotiable Instruments Law is
satisfied.9
Section 6 of the Bank Collection Code stipulates that it shall
be deemed the exercise of ordinary care to present a check for
payment through the clearing house. However, this code concerns
the legal relationship between the depositor and the collecting
bank, and its application would not extend to a suit against the
drawer or an indorser other than the depositor."
The Columbia-Knickerbocker Trust Company case placed
some emphasis upon the fact that the presentment took place
through, rather than at, the clearing house; and, as previously
noted, in the ordinary clearing house routine the check reaches the
drawee bank's office. But suppose the presentment is looked upon
as occurring at the clearing house. May it be successfully contended
that this satisfies the law?
It has already been maintained that the chief reason for pre-
senting an instrument for payment is to find out whether the in-
strument is to be honored or dishonored. If a factual situation
arises wherein the drawee's clearing house clerk has final authority
to pass upon this question at the clearing house, it is desirable that
7 Columbia-Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. Miller, 215 N.Y. 191, 109 N.E. 179
(1915); Turner v. Bank of Fox Lake, 3 Keyes 425 (N.Y. 1867); Harris v.
Packer, 3 Tyr. 370 n. (Lent Assizes, 1833); accord, Commercial and Farmers'
National Bank of Baltimore v. First National Bank of Baltimore, 30 Md. 11
(1869) (presenting check through clearing house not negligence; consequently,
no recovery from holder by drawee on forged check). The principle is tacitly
recognized in many of the cases cited in the next section of this paper, dealing
with the time of presentment for payment.
8 Supra note 7.
9 The custom of presentment through the clearing house does not invalidate
a presentment at the drawee's office. Kleekamp v. Meyer, 5 Mo. App. 444
(1878).
10 The Bank Collection Code was drafted by counsel for the American Bankers
Association and has been adopted in a number of states. For a list of the states
see Leary, Deferred Posting and Delayed Returns, 62 HARv. L. Rxv. 905, 919 n. 23
(1949).
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presentment at the clearing house be regarded as sufficient. There
is authority for this position at common law."
An analogous situation existed in Geibe v. Chicago Lake State
Bank, an unusual case decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court. 2
The drawer of a check sued the drawee for damages for loss of
credit resulting from the dishonor of the check. The drawee claimed
that the check had never been presented to it for payment, and
therefore could not have been dishonored. The drawee did not
belong to the local clearing house, but cleared through the X bank
as its clearing agent. The bank holding the check presented it to
the X bank at the clearing house. The facts do not show whether
the check reached the office of the X bank. At any rate, it never
reached the drawee bank, for, due to the state of the drawee bank's
account with the X bank, the latter dishonored the check. The
court held the presentment to the clearing agent sufficient, and
the drawer recovered despite the fact that the drawee would have
paid the check had presentment been made to it directly.
May we not argue from this decision that if a check is presented
at the clearing house to an agent of the drawee, clothed with the
power to honor or dishonor the check, the presentment is sufficient?
Of course, one obstacle to the use of the Geibe case to sustain
the above argument arises from the fact that the drawee was the
party setting up the lack of presentment. Since the drawee, by
appointing the X bank its clearing agent, consented to a present-
ment to the X bank, its position differed from that of a drawer or
indorser sued by the holder. In the latter instance, the drawer,
presumably ignorant of the relationship between the drawee and
the X bank, may scarcely be said to have consented to such a pre-
sentment unless considered as impliedly consenting to the whole
of the clearing house procedure, including the regulations for clear-
ing by nonmembers."
11 Reynolds v. Chettle, 2 Camp. N.P. 596, 170 Eng. Rep. 1263 (1811); cf.
Robson and Waugh v. Bennett, 2 Taunt. 388, 127 Eng. Rep. 1128 (C.P. 1810).
The argument expressed in the text likewise finds support by implication in
the following dictum in State Bank v. Weiss and Rubin, 46 Misc. 93, 94, 91
N.Y. Supp. 276, 277 (Sup. Ct. 1904): "The arrival of the checks at the branch
is to be taken as their first presentation for payment or dishonor, for it is not
to be supposed that the accountant and messengers attending the morning
session at the clearing house are equipped for more than comparisons and
verifications of lists and balances. Payment there was made without presenta-
tion, and accepted subject to future examination of the paper."
In Bistline v. Benting, 39 Idaho 534, 228 Pac. 309 (1924), counsel raised the
point, but the court was able to avoid deciding it.
12 160 Minn. 89, 199 N.W. 514 (1924), 9 MIN. L. REv. 67 (1924).
13 The effect of clearing house rules on nonmembers will be covered in a
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Admitting the desirability of upholding a presentment at the
clearing house if the drawee's agent has authority to honor or
dishonor the check, there remains the question of whether or not
the Negotiable Instruments Law permits such a presentment.
Adverting to the second and third subdivisions of Section 73, it
requires quite a stretch of the imagination to hold that presentment
at the clearing house constitutes presentment at either "the ad-
dress of the person to make payment" or "the usual place of busi-
ness . . . of the person to make payment," although one might
argue, with some degree of logic, that "the usual place of business"
for the purpose of honoring or dishonoring checks includes the place
at which a duly authorized agent is stationed for that purpose.
The fourth subdivision of Section 73 offers a stronger possi-
bility for reaching the desired end. It reads:
[Presentment for payment is made at the proper place:]
In any other case if presented to the person to make pay-
ment wherever he can be found ...
In a proper case a court might well hold that the bank was
"found" at the clearing house in the person of the authorized
agent. 4
Interesting as speculation upon the validity of presentment for
payment at the clearing house may be, the matter is ordinarily of
academic interest only, for, as has been indicated, clearing house
procedure in the United States does not contemplate anything
more at the clearing house than the exchange of items and calcu-
lation of balances. The honoring or dishonoring of the items takes
place at the office of the drawee bank.
Time of Presentment
Section 186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law reads as
follows:
A check must be presented for payment within a reason-
able time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged
from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by
the delay.
Section 193 provides that in the determination of what is a
subsequent article. In the presentment cases the courts for the most part do
not consider the question of express or implied consent by nonmembers to
clearing house procedure but base their decisions solely upon the Negotiable
Instruments Law requirements with reference to method and time of pre-
sentment.
14 Might Negotiable Instruments Law § 196 be invoked to help solve the
problem?
19491
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
reasonable or an unreasonable time, "regard is to be had to the
nature of the instrument, the usage of trade or business (if any)
with respect to such instruments, and the facts of the particular
case."
The typical situation involving the above sections occurs when
the drawee bank fails, as a consequence of which the check is dis-
honored. If the presentment took place within a "reasonable time",
the payee's position against the drawer is secure; otherwise the
payee (or other holder) must suffer the loss. 5
In view of the drastic effect of a failure to present the check
within a reasonable time, it is important to determine what con-
stitutes a reasonable time. If the payee and drawee are in the
same city, it is generally held that the check must be presented
before the close of banking hours on the next business day after its
issue, and this is true both at common law and under the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law.'"
With the wisdom of this "one-day rule" we are not concerned.
The problem of present interest involves the relaxation of the rule
to conform to customary methods of check collection in clearing
house cities. It is not usual for the payee to present his checks
directly to the drawee bank. Instead, he deposits them in his own
bank. This he may do in person or through the mails. The bank
of deposit, in turn, does not make direct presentment either. It
sends the checks to the clearing house, where they are delivered
to the drawee's clerk, and by him taken to the drawee. The com-
plete routine usually consumes more than a day. Thus, for ex-
ample, a check might be received by the payee on Monday,
deposited in his bank on Tuesday, and cleared on Wednesday,
resulting in a technical violation of the "one-day rule". Yet it is
unreasonable to expect the payee or the bank of deposit to make
Is Of course, the suit may be against an indorser rather than the drawer. In
that case § 71 of the Negotiable Instruments Law applies, plus § 185, making
the provisions relating to bills of exchange applicable to checks. As against the
indorser, failure to present within a reasonable time operates as an absolute
discharge, regardless of the question of loss. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 70;
BEUTEL'S BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 996, 1292 (7thed. 1948);
BIGELOW, BILLS, NoTEs, AND CHECKS § 226 (3d ed. 1928). The question of the
burden of showing loss, presumptions, etc., is beyond the scope of this paper.
See BEUTEL's BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 1293 (7thed. 1948).
16 BEUTEL'S BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 1296; BIGELOW, op. cit. supra
note 15, at 159, 266; 5 U.L.A. (pt. 2) 662 (1943); 20 BANKING L.J. 13 (1903);
8 U. OF IN. L. REv. 204 (1934). It is obviously impracticable to treat this
matter fully. We are dealing with only one phase of it; i.e., clearing house
presentment.
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direct presentation on Tuesday; in fact, such a requirement would
entirely upset the beneficial clearing procedure and would necessi-
tate a return to the evils of the pre-clearing house era.' Of course,
the delay might be averted if the payee received the check at an
early enough hour on Monday to enable him to deposit it on the
same day, for it could then be cleared on Tuesday. But he might
receive the check at such a time or under such circumstances that
it would be an unjustified inconvenience to require him to deposit
it on the same day. Furthermore, such a requirement fails to take
account of the rather prevalent custom of depositing by mail.
There is no reason for courts to refuse recognition of the cus-
tomary procedure. In fact, Section 193 enjoins upon them the
duty to recognize it. And this section, together with Section 186,
has been regarded as merely expressing the common law. Hence,
both before and after the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments
Law, courts should have made an exception to the "one-day rule"
if necessary to conform to local business usage.
In most of the decided cases the payee received the check after
banking hours. This obviously strengthens the payee's case,
although even in such a situation a confirmed "one-day rule" court
might refuse to budge. However, a majority of the states which
have decided the question have held that if the payee receives the
check after banking hours and it is presented through the clearing
house two days later, the presentment is made within a reasonable
time.' 9
In creating this exception, some courts have salved their judicial
17 See Andrews, supra note 1, at 582, 584, 603.
18 Maryland Title Guarantee Co. v. Alter, 167 Md. 244, 173 AtI. 200 (1934);
Farm and Home Savings and Loan Association v. Stubbs, 231 Mo. App. 87,
98 S.W. 2d 320 (1936); Rosenbaum and Mendel v. Thomas, 8 Tenn. App. 89(1928).
19 (Unless otherwise noted, the Negotiable Instruments Law was in force.)
Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Goodman, 173 Ark. 489, 292 S.W. 659
(1927); Clarke v. Davis, 48 Idaho 214, 281 Pac. 3 (1929); Bistline v. Benting,
39 Idaho 534, 228 Pac. 309 (1924); Oosterbeek Motor Co. v. Joy, 268 Ill.
App. 278 (1932) (cashier's check); Marrett v. Brackett, 60 Me. 524 (1872)
(common law); Maryland Title Guarantee Co. v. Alter, 167 Md. 244, 173
Atl. 200 (1934); Zaloom v. Ganim, 72 Misc. 36, 129 N.Y. Supp. 85 (Sup. Ct.
1911), aff'd mem., 148 App. Div. 892, 132 N.Y. Supp. 1151 (1st Dep't 1911);
Loux and Son v. Fox, 171 Pa. 68, 33 Atl. 190 (1895) (common law); Rosen-
baum and Mendel v. Thomas, 8 Tenn. App. 89 (1928) (treated as received
after banking hours, although payee's agent actually received it a few minutes
before close, but did not reach payee's office until after). See 3 M. L. Rv.
87 (1938).
A greater degree of diligence is required on the part of a collecting bank
taking a check in payment. Bank of Commerce v. Miller, 105 Ill. App. 224
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consciences by the rather dubious argument that a check received
on Monday after banking hours is really not received until Tues-
day, from which it follows that presentment on Wednesday satis-
fies the rule." But most of the courts decide the question upon
the basis of business custom, noting the inconvenience and imprac-
ticability of a strict adherence to the "one-day rule".
Section 193 would appear to require the result reached by the
majority of the courts." The provision discharging drawers and
indorsers for the holder's failure to present on time was not in-
tended to require payees or their employees to spend the day run-
ning back and forth between office and bank.2
As might be expected, some courts have not taken the pro-
gressive point of view, and have adhered to the old landmarks.2"
The most charitable criticism of these cases is to point out that, for
the most part, they were decided at comparatively early dates. Yet
certain arguments propounded in them merit attention, if only
for the purpose of refutation.
Thus, in Rosenblatt v. Haberman,24 the court, in a sort of
retributive mood, took the position that if the payee wishes to
present his checks through the banking system instead of directly,
he should jolly well be willing to take the consequences. Similarly,
in Edmisten v. Herpolsheimer, 25 the court used the equally flimsy
(1902); Noble v. Doughten, 72 Kan. 336, 83 Pac. 1048 (1905); BRADY, BAK
Cncxs § 299 (2d ed. 1926).
Knowledge of the drawee bank's unstable condition accelerates the time
for presentment. Holbrook v. W. L. Moody & Co., 45 S.W. 2d 685 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1931). There are many decisions on this point, which is beyond the
scope of this paper.
20 Bistline v. Benting, 39 Idaho 534, 228 Pac. 309 (1924); Loux and Son v.
Fox, 171 Pa. 68, 33 At. 190 (1895). This argument overlooks the fact that
the "one-day rule", as generally applied, makes no distinction between checks
received before and checks received after banking hours.
21 In general, the courts appear to take judicial notice of the custom. E.g.,
Maryland Title Guarantee Co. v. Alter, 167 Md. 244, 173 Ad. 200 (1934).
For an early common law case in which the custom was proved, see Marrett
v. Brackett, 60 Me. 524 (1872).
22 It might be argued that the payee should send his Monday checks to the
bank early enough on Tuesday for the Tuesday clearings, but this is often
impracticable, if not impossible, and the courts following the majority view
do not require it.
23 Rosenblatt v. Haberman, 8 Mo. App. 486 (1880); Edmisten v. Herpol-
sheimer, 66 Neb. 94, 92 N W. 138 (1901), af'd on rehearing, 66 Neb. 98, 92 N.W.
140 (1902); Davis v. Benton, 2 Ohio Dec. Repr. 329 (C. P. 1860); Dorchester
v. Merchants National Bank of Houston, 106 Tex. 201, 163 S.W. 5 (1914);
cf. Loland v. Nelson, 139 Ore. 581, 8 P. 2d 82 (1932).
24 Supra note 23.
25 66 Neb. 94, 92 N.W. 138 (1901), aJJ'd on rehearing, 66 Neb. 98, 92 N.W. 140
(1902), supra note 23.
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ground that a lack of diligence cannot be excused by a showing that
it is customary.2" Both these arguments beg the question, for, as
already indicated, custom plays a vital role in the determination
of diligence.
The Edmisten case stressed also the fact that the drawee bank
was located within two blocks of the payee's place of business.27
If it is customary to send checks to one's bank of deposit rather
than to present them directly, the distance element should cut no
figure. In an already complex world, it would be ludicrous to
force each payee or his attorney to decide whether the distance
to the drawee bank is sufficient to relieve the payee from direct
presentment.2"
A criticism of the Edmisten case is worth quoting. Writes the
critic:
This decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska gives a
sort of judicial black-eye to clearing houses. It savors of the
day of the stage coach and the bank runner when the volume
of business was infinitesimal as compared with that of the
present day; as if some Rip Van Winkle judge had awakened
from a long sleep to preside over a modern business transac-
tion and, not long enough awake to comprehend the growth
and needs of business communities of the present day, had
applied rules suited to conditions which existed fifty years
back.29
The drawer and indorsers have no right to expect any higher
degree of diligence than that attained by a compliance with
the regular and ordinary course of business.30 Reasonableness is a
26A similar argument was advanced by the court in Dorchester v. Merchants
National Bank of Houston, 106 Tex. 201, 163 S.W. 5 (1914), supra note 23.
The Edmisten case placed reliance upon Holmes v. Roe, 62 Mich. 199, 28 N.W.
864 (1886), and First National Bank of Wymore v. Miller, 37 Neb. 500, 55 N.W.
1064 (1893), neither of which is in point.
27 In Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Goodman, 173 Ark. 489, 292 S.W.
659 (1927), the fact that the distance between the payee's office and the drawee
bank was but forty feet did not prevent the court from holding the present-
ment timely.
28 As a practical matter, the suggested difficulty would seldom occur to the
payee, for comparatively few people have the slightest acquaintance with the
rules of diligent presentment. It is only when the drawee bank fails that in-
credulous payees are brought face to face with these exacting mandates.
Query: Should the law take cognizance of the custom, if any, among non-
business people to wait more than a day before depositing their checks?
29 20 BANuuI1G L. J. 13, 18 (1903).
30 See Sedgwick, J., dissenting, in Edmisten v. Herpolsheimer, 66 Neb. 98,
104, 92 N.W. 140, 142 (1902) (on rehearing).
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Janus-faced creature, whose countenance should shine upon payee
and drawer alike."'
Admittedly a check received before the bank's closing hour
presents a more difficult problem than one received after. Sup-
pose, for example, that the payee receives the check at 9 a.m.
Monday, but waits until Tuesday to take it to his bank. Suppose
further, either that checks received on Tuesday are not cleared
until Wednesday, or that, if cleared on Tuesday, the payee does
not deposit his check early enough for the Tuesday clearing. Or,
as an alternative, suppose the payee deposits his checks by mail,
as a consequence of which they do not reach the bank in time for
Tuesday's exchanges at the clearing house.
Although a court may readily take judicial notice of the custom
to deposit one's checks in one's own bank rather than to present
them directly to the drawee, it is not quite so easy to "judicially
know" that payees receiving checks on Monday morning do not
deposit them until Tuesday. On the other hand, the custom of
depositing by mail seems sufficiently general in some communities
to come within the protection of judicial notice; and if a deposit
by hand is made on Tuesday about the time when the Monday
mail arrives, a court would look rather foolish in holding the de-
positor delinquent in the one case and diligent in the other.
Even in the mail deposit situation, complicating factors may
be present. Suppose that the payee receives the check at 9 a.m.
Monday, and that if he mails his deposits before noon, they will
reach the bank on Monday afternoon, whereas if he fails to mail
them until afternoon, they will not arrive until Tuesday. Assuming
that he does not mail them until afternoon, and conceding that a
court should take judicial notice of the custom of depositing by
mail, should it take the further step of "judicially knowing" that
business people usually do not mail their checks to the bank on
the morning of their receipt? The possible complexities arising
from this and other similar situations are apparent.
Of course, if the payee is able to prove the asserted custom,
he should have nothing to worry about, but the problem of proving
it presents serious difficulties. To prove that many people deposit
by mail is one thing; to prove that they wait until the afternoon
mail is a horse of a different color.
There are few cases deciding whether a check received before
the close of banking hours is presented within a reasonable time
31 Or upon payee and indorser alike, in a suit between them.
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if deposited the next day and cleared the day after deposit. In
an Arkansas case the payee received the check slightly more than
two hours before the bank's closing time, yet failed to deposit it
until 10 a.m. the next day-too late for the day's clearing.2
Despite this delay the court held the presentment timely. Unfor-
tunately, however, the court failed to direct its attention to the
problems incident to the time of receipt and time of deposit; and,
even more unfortunately, it reached its decision on the strength
of the cases involving checks received after banking hours. The
evidence indicated a custom of depositing checks in the payee's
own bank, rather than presenting them directly to the drawee, but
did not go further except to reveal the custom of presentment
through the clearing house. In other words, the evidence did not
show that a payee, receiving a check more than two hours before
the bank closed, customarily waited until after the next day's
clearing before depositing it.
Somewhat less disappointing is a Michigan case reaching a
like result.3 The check was received by the payee between 1 p.m.
and 3 p.m., in time to have been deposited on the same day.
Instead, the payee deposited it the following day, apparently too
late for the clearing. There was testimony that the depositing of
checks on the morning after their receipt, and their presentment
the succeeding day through the clearing house, accorded with the
regular custom of business. In upholding the reasonableness of
the time of presentment, the court, fully aware that the payee
could have deposited the check on the day of its receipt, took the
very sensible position that to require a greater degree of prompt-
ness than that exercised by the payee would be a bar to the rea-
sonable and practical use of checks in commercial transactions.
As so often happens, however, there is a hitch in the Michigan
case as an authority, for the Bank Collection Code had been
adopted by the Michigan legislature, and influenced the court to
some extent. 4 Section 6 (B) of the Code provides that the bank
of deposit exercises ordinary care by presenting an item through
the local clearing house on the next business day after receiving it.
The court reasoned that the payee should not be required to act
32 George H. McFadden Brothers' Agency v. Keesee, 179 Ark. 510, 16 S.W.
2d 994 (1929).
33 Bay City Bank v. Concordia Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 260 Mich. 611,
245 N.W. 532 (1932), 31 MIcH. L. REv. 1156 (1933).
34 The effect of the Bank Collection Code upon the problem under discussion
will be further considered infra.
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more promptly in depositing the check than the bank in clearing
it. Whether the decision would have been the same without the
aid of the Bank Collection Code cannot be stated with certainty,
although the language of the opinion leads to the belief that the
absence of the Code would not have led to a contrary holding.
Opposed to the Arkansas and Michigan cases is a decision ren-
dered by a Missouri appellate court. 5 In view of the fact that
an earlier Missouri case 6 had held the presentment too late even
when the payee received the check after banking hours, the decis-
ion is not surprising. Nevertheless the result is especially regrettable
because the delivery of the check to the payee occurred only a
short time before the bank's closing hour. Under such circumstances
he should not be compelled to put everything else aside and rush
to the bank.
Even more significant than the Missouri case is the decision
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Wendkos v. Scranton
Life Ins. Co.," adhering strictly to the "one-day rule" where the
check was received on Monday morning. The particular signifi-
cance arises from the fact that in Loux and Son v. Fox,3" Pennsyl-
vania had held to the contrary where the check was received after
banking hours. Of the Loux case the court in the Wendkos case
said:
That case simply held that the day of receipt is not to
be counted when the check was received after banking
hours.3 9
Thus, the Wendkos court held that presentment for payment
came too late although the payee deposited his check on Tuesday,
and it was presented through customary banking channels on
Wednesday."
The Arkansas and Michigan decisions reach a result more
consonant with common sense. And "common sense" and "rea-
sonableness" are akin.
35 Farm and Home Savings and Loan Association v. Stubbs, 231 Mo. App.
87, 98 S.W. 2d 320 (1936), 2 Mo. L. REv. 216 (1937).
36 Rosenblatt v. Haberman, 8 Mo App. 486 (1880), cited supra note 23.
37 340 Pa. 550, 17 A. 2d 895 (1941).
38 171 Pa. 68, 33 Adt. 190 (1895), cited supra note 19.
39 Wendkos v. Scranton Life Ins. Co., 340 Pa. 550, 553, 17 A. 2d 895, 897
(1941).
40 Since the check was drawn on a bank not a member of the clearing house,
presentment was made through the Federal Reserve Bank in accordance with
local clearing house custom.
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Even in the absence of a finding, through judicial notice or
proof, that a one-day delay in making the deposit is customary,
courts should hold as a matter of law that the payee exercises
proper diligence by depositing his Monday checks at some time on
Tuesday, so that they may go through the clearing house on
Wednesday. Section 193 does not require that every phase of
the payee's conduct be hallowed by custom. It merely invokes the
aid of custom in the determination of the ultimate issue. To hold it
unreasonable for a payee to deposit his Monday checks on Tuesday
is to demand a degree of efficiency too exacting for this mundane
sphere and surely beyond the expectations (if any) of the drawer
or indorser.
Of course in some instances the clause of Section 193 directing
the court to regard "the facts of the particular case" may be em-
ployed to justify the payee's conduct. For example, if the payee
were a doctor, and his secretary happened to be sick and away
from the office on the Monday in question, no one would expect
him to abandon his professional duties for the purpose of deposit-
ing his checks. But even without the help of that clause, and with-
out the presence of any exculpatory facts, courts should uphold
the "received on Monday, deposited on Tuesday, cleared on
Wednesday ' routine.
Likewise, the rule should be extended to cover the situation
arising from the fact that the payee's bank is not a member of
the local clearing house, but clears through a member bank. Under
these circumstances an additional delay of a day may occur. For
example, in an Illinois case the payee received the check on June
5 and deposited it in his bank on June 6, a Saturday. His bank,
not belonging to the clearing house, sent the check to its clearing
agent bank, which received the item on Monday, June 8, and made
presentment through the clearing house on Tuesday, June 9. The
court very properly held that presentment was made within a rea-
sonable time.41 No reason exists for penalizing a payee because
41 Johannsen v. Evans, 271 Ill. App. 372 (1933). The only fly in the oint-
ment was that the stipulation of facts recited that defendant had enough
money on June 5 to meet the check. Confining the stipulation to the exact
facts set forth, it would follow that the check would not have been met even
if presented on June 6 or June 8, as a result of which defendant suffered no
loss by reason of the delay. How much this influenced the court is impossible
to ascertain.
Cf. Willis and Siddons v. Finley, 173 Pa. 28, 34 Adt. 213 (1896) (payee
deposited check on day received; his bank did not belong to clearing house);
Village of Lombard v. Anderson and Glen Falls Indemnity Co., 280 Ill. App.
283 (1935) (both banks in same village; no clearing house; bank of deposit
sent check to its Chicago correspondent, rather than presenting directly).
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he chooses to keep his account with a bank which does not belong
to the clearing house.
Naturally, a court adopting the view believed preferable in the
presentment cases will have no need to invoke Section 6 (B) of
the Bank Collection Code, although it will be recalled that the
Michigan court bolstered its decision by a reliance thereon.4 2 It
might be argued that legislative permission for the bank of deposit
to send the item to the clearing house on the day after deposit
impliedly permits the payee to deposit the item on the day follow-
ing his receipt of it, although the argument has obvious weak-
nesses. Be that as it may, the other authorities on the point have
dismissed the Bank Collection Code from their deliberations, upon
the ground that it relates solely to the rights and liabilities between
the depositor and the collecting bank.43 However, entirely apart
from the Bank Collection Code, it is to be hoped that modem
courts will adopt the sensible and businesslike view that a check
received on Monday, deposited on Tuesday, and cleared on
Wednesday is presented for payment within a reasonable time.4"
42 See supra p.10 7 . The court held that the practical effect of the Code was
to extend the time of presentment by one day.
43 Maryland Title Guarantee Co. v. Alter, 167 Md. 244, 173 Ad. 200 (1934),
supra note 19; Farm and Home Savings and Loan Association v. Stubbs, 231
Mo. App. 87, 98 S.W. 2d 320 (1936), supra note 35. The former case upheld
the presentment anyhow; the latter, holding the presentment too late, rejected
the Bank Collection Code as a reason for a contrary holding.
44 Some states have attempted to solve the problem by statute. See, for
example, ALA. CODE, tit. 5, § 130 (1) (Supp. 1947); Wyo. Comp. STAT. § 35-
1014 (1945).
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